

I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent I be allowed to speak as in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, the Senate will soon be asked to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. The intent of this treaty is to implement a worldwide ban on the production, possession, and use of chemical weapons, which is something we would all agree to; if it were something that was enforceable or verifiable, that we would be a party to. However, most of the experts I have talked to—people like Caspar Weinberger, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, William Clark, I even had a conversation with Dick Cheney—have serious questions as to whether or not this is in the best interests of the United States.

The problem we have, one of many problems, but the major problem we have with the CWC, the Chemical Weapons Convention, is that it does not include those countries that pose the greatest threat to our Nation's security. I am talking about Libya and Iraq, North Korea, Syria. They are not a part of this. Even if they were a part, I would not believe they would actually live up to their commitment. But, again, they are not. Some countries have signed onto the treaty but they have not ratified it. We seem to be acting as if all those countries that have signed the treaty ultimately will ratify it. I do not believe that is the case.

Even in the case of Russia, if they did, the Senator from North Carolina here can remember, back in 1990, when the Russians and the United States, then the Soviet Union and the United States, had a bilateral destruction agreement, yet the Russians have not lived up to it—not because they do not want to, necessarily; because they say they cannot afford to. In fact, they said if you in the United States expect us in Russia to live up to the bilateral destruction agreement of 1990, it will cost you approximately \$3.3 billion. I do not anticipate there will be a lot of support for that.

They keep saying 160 countries have signed the treaty. This is fine, but they are the wrong countries. We do not have a problem, a threat of chemical warfare with Great Britain, with France, with Sweden, with these countries. It is the countries who are not a part of this that pose the threat.

The compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention is not verifiable.

Countries like China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, but our ability to verify their compliance is doubtful at best. I think the best quote I can give is from the former CIA Director James Woolsey, who was the CIA Director under Democratic Presidents. He said:

The chemical weapons problem is so difficult from an intelligence perspective that I cannot state that we have high confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially on a small scale.

The U.N. inspectors, after the agreement was reached with Iraq back in 1991, have had all kinds of opportunities to look for chemical weapons in Iraq, yet many have gone undetected. So we will be asked to ratify this. I serve notice now I will be among the leaders in opposition to that ratification. I feel it is very similar to the ratification of the START II agreement. The START II agreement was an agreement that would force us back into a posture that we found ourselves in in 1972 with the ABM Treaty, which was with, at that time, the Soviet Union. It does not do any good for us to downgrade our nuclear capability, as was the case there, if we have 25 to 30 nations who are building a nuclear capability, who have weapons of mass destruction, who are working on the missile means of delivering them. I see a parallel here, an analogous situation.

What good does it do for us to agree to destroy all of our chemical capability if we are allowing those rogue nations that pose the greatest threat to the United States to still be able to have theirs?

I think one of the phoniest arguments, though, is on terrorism. I hope no one will give much credence to that. The President and his administration contradicted themselves the other day when the President was trying to lead us into this notion that, if we ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, somehow it will make it more difficult for terrorists. He said:

If the Chemical Weapons Convention were in force today, it would be much more difficult for terrorists to acquire chemical weapons.

Then a short while after that, in a response, Warren Christopher said:

It is difficult to predict what impact the CWC will have on actual terrorist use of chemical weapons, as the CWC was not designed to deal with this threat.

He was exactly right.

So I hope we are not lulled into a false sense of security by ratifying a convention that is not verifiable and that is not participated in by those parties and those countries that pose the greatest threat to the United States.

I come from Oklahoma, and if a terrorist was able to get enough explosive power to blow up the Murrah Federal Office Building to the extent it happened there, I can assure you that the terrorists will also be able to get chemical weapons.

So, Madam President, I hope my colleagues share my concern about this, the harmful impact of the chemical weapons convention on our Nation's security, and will join me in opposing the ratification of this flawed agreement.

I yield the floor.

Mr. HELMS. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. INHOFE. Yes.

Mr. HELMS. I especially appreciate the Senator's comments, because there is so much confusion, so many extravagant statements have been made, Madam President, about how much good this convention will do, this treaty.

As I mentioned yesterday, Senator Sam Ervin, my first colleague from North Carolina when I came to the Senate—a pretty good constitutional lawyer—used to comment that the United States had never lost a war or won a treaty, meaning that we got short shrift by accepting so many treaties that didn't do the country any good.

But the thing that bothers me, I say to my colleague, and I am sure it does to him, is that so many—even in this Chamber, I am sorry to say—are willing to disregard the fact that the White House has stonewalled about allowing the Senate to have documents that the Senate is entitled to have with respect to this treaty. They refused, in some cases, they have obfuscated, they have made all sorts of excuses, and I am happy that the distinguished majority leader, Mr. LOTT, has talked to Mr. Pannetta, and there is some indication that these documents are going to be made available to the Senate.

Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. HELMS. Certainly.

Mr. INHOFE. It is my understanding that as chairman of the appropriate committee, you made a request sometime ago for all of these documents in order for us to deliberate this, to debate this, to determine whether or not this was in the best interest of our Nation's security. Have you received any response so far to your request?

Mr. HELMS. Half hearted responses in a few cases. In large measure, the administration has stonewalled the matter and refused to release the actual documents.

The intelligence community of our Government unanimously say that this treaty has many aspects that are perilous to the security of the United States.

But in any case, I thank the Senator for his comments and for his role in trying to protect the people of this country from a treaty or a convention that is unwise, as in this case. I thank the Senator.

Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator, too.

Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair for recognizing me.